Heidegger's Conception of "Phenomenon"

The Greek for phenomenon () is derived from the verb “to show itself,” a word which also connoted “bringing something into the light.” For Heidegger, “phenomenon” is “that which shows itself in itself.” Since our access to the phenomenon varies, it is possible for an entity to show itself as something it is not (a mode which Heidegger terms “seeming” or “semblance”). “Showing itself” is therefore a necessary component of “phenomenon.” In addition to the view of “phenomenon” as that “which shows itself in itself,” Heidegger outlines three more connected structures of his conception of phenomenon which, in turn, provide three notions or conceptions of “phenomenon.” As Heidegger states, our point of interest is the phenomenological conception of the word, the Being of Dasein. In other words, the “phenomena” of phenomenology will underlie the particular manifestations of beings.

First, Heidegger states that “phenomena” can show themselves in a private manner if they show what they in themselves are not. This “seeming” or “semblance” is a private modification of “phenomenon.” An example would be a stick floating down a river; it seems broken, yet the seeming of the broken stick is structurally connected to the straight stick. Next, Heidegger discusses appearance, an element involving two structural movements. The general description of appearance is, as Heidegger sets forth, something that shows itself in such a manner for the purpose of announcing that something else does not show itself. Unidentifiable lumps, for example, announce the presence of cancer; the cancer is the ground for the appearance of the lumps. That which appears, the cancer, is what does not show itself, but appears through something that does show itself. On the other hand, the lumps—the appearance—are those things that show themselves in such a way in order to announce that which appears (the cancer). Last, Heidegger discusses “mere appearance,” a reference to Kant’s formulation of “appearance.” In this notion of “phenomenon,” the appearance announces the thing in question in such a way that the “thing in itself” can never become manifest (or appear). The appearance itself radiates forth from the non-manifest in such a way that what is announced is basically covered up.

Heidegger establishes these different senses of “phenomenon” to distinguish phenomenological “phenomena” as “self-showing” from traditional interpretations of “phenomenon” as appearance and “semblance.” This phenomenological sense of “phenomenon” has three structures. The first is the formal conception, which states that a phenomenon is that which shows itself in (or from) itself—a kind of showing. The second structure is the ordinary conception; phenomena are the objects of our intuitions and what we perceive. We ordinarily understand these as appearances and they fall under the formal concept of phenomenon in that they involve a type of showing. Third, Heidegger asserts that the phenomenological concept of phenomenon is related to Kantian intuition more than it is to concrete, “filled in” modes of intuition. Yet the phenomena in this sense show themselves un-thematically, and it is necessary for us to uncover these phenomena so they will show themselves in a direct (thematic) self-showing. Heidegger concludes his section on phenomenology with a simple statement: the phenomenon of phenomenology is nothing less than the Being of beings.